The virtues and vices of equilibrium and the future of financial economics by J. Doyne Farmer & John Geanakoplos
The Virtues and Vices of
Equilibrium and the Future
of Financial Economics
J. Doyne  Farmer
John   Geanakoplos
SFI WORKING PAPER:  2008-03-014
SFI Working Papers contain accounts of scientific work of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the
views of the Santa Fe Institute.  We accept papers intended for publication in peer-reviewed journals or 
proceedings volumes, but not papers that have already appeared in print.  Except for papers by our external
faculty, papers must be based on work done at SFI, inspired by an invited visit to or collaboration at SFI, or
funded by an SFI grant.
©NOTICE: This working paper is included by permission of the contributing author(s) as a means to ensure
timely distribution of the scholarly and technical work on a non-commercial basis.   Copyright and all rights
therein are maintained by the author(s). It is understood that all persons copying this information will
adhere to the terms and constraints invoked by each author's copyright. These works  may  be reposted only
with the explicit permission of the copyright holder.
www.santafe.edu
SANTA FE INSTITUTE
 The virtues and vices of equilibrium
and the future of nancial economics
J. Doyne Farmer and John Geanakoplosy
March 20, 2008
Abstract
The use of equilibrium models in economics springs from the desire
for parsimonious models of economic phenomena that take human rea-
soning into account. This approach has been the cornerstone of modern
economic theory. We explain why this is so, extolling the virtues of
equilibrium theory; then we present a critique and describe why this
approach is inherently limited, and why economics needs to move in
new directions if it is to continue to make progress. We stress that
this shouldn't be a question of dogma, but should be resolved empir-
ically. There are situations where equilibrium models provide useful
predictions and there are situations where they can never provide use-
ful predictions. There are also many situations where the jury is still
out, i.e., where so far they fail to provide a good description of the
world, but where proper extensions might change this. Our goal is to
convince the skeptics that equilibrium models can be useful, but also to
make traditional economists more aware of the limitations of equilib-
rium models. We sketch some alternative approaches and discuss why
they should play an important role in future research in economics.
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31 Introduction
The concept of equilibrium has dominated economics and nance for at
least fty years. Motivated by the sound desire to nd a parsimonious
description of the world, equilibrium theory has had an enormous impact
on the way that economists think, and indeed in many respects denes the
way economists think. Nonetheless, its empirical validity and the extent of
its scope still remains a matter of debate. Its proponents argue that it has
been enormously successful, and that it at least qualitatively explains many
aspects of real economic phenomena. Its detractors argue that when one
probes to the bottom, most of its predictions are essentially unfalsiable and
therefore are not in fact testable scientic theories. We attempt to give some
clarity to this debate. Our view is that while equilibrium theory is useful,
there are inherent limitations to what it can ever achieve. Economists must
expand the scope of equilibrium theory, explore entirely new approaches,
and combine equilibrium methods with new approaches.
This paper is the outcome of an eight year conversation between an
economist and a physicist. Both of us have been involved in developing
trading strategies for hedge funds, giving us a deep appreciation of the dier-
ence between theories that are empirically useful and those that are merely
aesthetically pleasing. Our hedge funds use completely dierent strategies.
The strategy the economist developed uses equilibrium methods with be-
havioral modications to trade mortgage-backed securities; the strategy the
physicist developed uses time-series methods based on historical patterns to
trade stocks, an approach that is in some sense the antithesis of the equi-
librium method. Both strategies have been highly successful. We initially
came at the concept of equilibrium from very dierent points of view, one
very supportive and the other very skeptical. We have had many arguments
over the last eight years. Surprisingly, we have more or less come to agree
on the advantages and disadvantages of the equilibrium approach and the
need to go beyond it. The view presented here is the result of this dialogue.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present a short qual-
itative review of what equilibrium theory is and what it is not, and in Sec-
tion 3 we discuss the related idea of market eciency and its importance in
nance. In Section 4 we present what we think are the accomplishments and
strengths of equilibrium theory, and in Section 5 we discuss its inherent lim-
itations from a theoretical perspective. In Section 6 we review the empirical
evidence for and against equilibrium models. Then in Section 7 we develop
some further motivation for non-equilibrium models, illustrated by a few
problems that we think are inherently out of equilibrium. We also compare
4equilibrium in physics and economics and use non-equilibrium models in
physics to motivate corresponding models in economics. In Section 8 we re-
view several alternatives approaches, including now established approaches
such as behavioral and experimental economics. We also describe some less
established approaches to dealing with bounded rationality, specialization
and heterogeneous agents. We make a distinction between the structural
properties of a model (those depend on the structure of institutions and in-
teractions) vs. the strategic properties (those that depend on the strategies
of agents) and discuss problems in which structure dominates (so equilib-
rium may not be very important). We also discuss how ideas from biology
may be useful for understanding markets. Finally in Section 9 we present
some conclusions.
2 What is an equilibrium theory?
In this section we explain the basic idea and the motivation for the neoclas-
sical concept of economic equilibrium, and discuss some variations on the
basic theme.
Market equilibrium models are designed to describe the market inter-
actions of rational agents in an economy. The prototype is the general
equilibrium theory of Arrow and Debrieu [7, 43]. The economy consists of a
set of goods, such as seed, corn, apples, and labor time, and a set of agents
(households) who decide what to buy and sell, how and what to produce,
and how much to consume of each good. Agents are characterized by their
endowments, technologies, and utilities. The endowment of an agent is the
set of all goods she inherits: for example, her ability to labor, the apples
on the trees in her backyard and so on. The technology of an agent is her
collection of recipes for transforming goods into others, like seed into corn.
She might buy the seed and hire the labor to do the job, or use her own
seed and labor. Some recipes are better than others, and not all agents
have access to the same technologies. The utility of an agent describes how
much happiness she gets out of consuming the goods. The agent does not
get pleasure out of each good separately, but only in the context of all the
goods she consumes taken together.
The goal is to model the decisions of agents incentivized solely by their
own selsh goals, and to deduce the consequences for the production, con-
sumption, and pricing of each good. The model of Arrow and Debrieu is
based on four assumptions:
1. Perfect competition (price taking). Each agent is small enough to have
5a negligible eect on prices. Agents \take" the prices as given, in the
sense that they are oered prices at which they can buy or sell as much
as they want, but the agents cannot do anything to change the prices.
2. Agent optimization of utility. At the given prices each agent indepen-
dently chooses what to buy, what and how to produce, and what to
sell so as to maximize her utility. There is no free lunch { the cost of
all purchases must be nanced by sales. An agent can only buy corn,
for example, by selling an equal value of her labor, or apples, or some
other good from her endowment.
3. Market clearing. The aggregate demand, i.e. the total quantity that
people wish to buy, must be equal to the aggregate supply, i.e. the
total quantity that people wish to sell.
4. Rational expectations. Agents make rational decisions based on perfect
information. They have perfect models of the world. They know the
prices of every good before they decide how much to buy or sell of any
good.
To actually use this theory one must of course make it concrete by speci-
fying the set of goods in the economy, how production depends on labor and
other inputs, and a functional form for the utilities. General equilibrium
theory was revolutionary because it provided closure, giving a framework
connecting the dierent components of the economy to each other and pro-
viding a minimum set of assumptions necessary to get a solution. The be-
havior of markets is an extraordinarily complicated and subtle phenomenon,
but neoclassical economists believe that most of it can be explained on the
basis of equilibrium.
The advent of general equilibrium theory marked a major transition in
the discipline of economics. It gave hope for a quantitative explanation of
the properties of the economy in one grand theory, causing a sea change in
the way economics is done and in the kind of people that do it. Mainstream
economics shifted from a largely qualitative pursuit, often called \political
economy", to a highly mathematical eld in which papers are often published
in theorem-proof format.
We do not have the space to describe the many applications and conse-
quences of equilibrium in any detail. The most important consequence for
our purposes is eciency, which we shall come to shortly. In the remain-
der of this section we discuss some logical questions one might raise about
whether equilibrium exists and how and whether it is attainable. Then we
6give a few examples of how equilibrium models are being continuously ex-
tended to include more phenomena, and develop the concept of nancial
equilibrium, our central topic here.
2.1 Existence of equilibrium and xed points
In equilibrium everybody's plans are fullled. An agent who plans to buy
three ears of corn by selling two apples at the given prices will nd agents
who want to sell him the three ears of corn and others who want to buy his
two apples. A mother who goes to the store to buy her children bread will
nd as much as she wants to buy at the going prices on the shelves; yet at
the end of the day the store will not be left with extra bread that goes to
waste. One might well wonder how this could happen without any central
coordinator. In short, why should there be an equilibrium? This is called
the existence problem.
In 1954 Arrow, Debreu, and McKenzie simultaneously showed that there
always is an equilibrium, no matter what the endowments and technologies
and utilities, provided that each utility displays diminishing marginal utility
of consumption and each technology displays diminishing marginal product.
The margin is a very famous concept in economics that was discovered by
Jevons, Menger,and Walras in the so-called marginal revolution of 1871.
Apples display diminishing marginal utility if the more apples an agent
consumes, the less additional happiness he achieves from one more apple.
Diminishing marginal product means that the more a good like labor is used
in production, the less extra output comes from one additional unit (hour)
of input.
The method of proof used by all these authors was rst to guess a vector
of prices, one for each good, then to compute demand and supply at these
prices, and then to increase the prices for the goods with excess demand
and to decrease the prices of goods with excess supply. This denes a map
from price vectors to price vectors. A price vector generates an equilibrium
if and only if it is mapped into itself by this map (for then there is no
excess demand or excess supply). By a clever use of Brouwer's xed point
theorem, it was shown that there must always be a xed point and therefore
an equilibrium.
72.2 Getting to Equilibrium
2.2.1 Tatonnement
Who sets the equilibrium prices? How does the economy get to equilibrium?
Just because there is an equilibrium does not mean it is easy to nd. One
suggestion of the marginalist Leon Walras was that the equilibrium map
could be iterated over and over. Starting from a guess, one could keep
increasing and decreasing prices depending on whether there was too much
demand or supply. He called this groping (tatonnement in French) toward
equilibrium. Unfortunately, after many years of analysis, it became clear
that in general this tatonnement can cycle without ever getting close to
equilibium.
2.2.2 Omniscience
An alternative is that the agents know the characteristics of their competi-
tors and know that they are rational and will not sell their goods at less
than they could get elsewhere; if it is common knowledge that everybody is
rational, and if the characteristics are common knowledge, then each agent
will himself solve for equilibrium and the prices will simply emerge.
This explanation for the emergence of prices has an analogue in Nash
equilibrium in game theory. A game is a contest in which each player makes
a move and receives a payo that depends on this move as well as the moves
of the other players. The question is how does a player know what move
to make without knowing what moves his opponents will make? And how
can he guess what they will do without knowing what they think he will do?
This circular conundrum was resolved by Nash in 1951 who basically showed
that there is always at least one self-consistent xed point in the space of
strategies. To be more specic, a Nash equilibrium is an assignment of moves
to each player such that if each player thought the others would follow their
assignments, then he would want to follow his. In game theory the question
also arises: who announces this assignment? If the players are all perfectly
logical, and are aware of all their characteristics, they should deduce the
assignment.
2.3 Financial Equilibrium Models
2.3.1 Time, Uncertainty, and Securities
One of the main limitations of general equilibrium theory (as described so
far) is that it is cast in a non-temporal setting. There is only one time
8period, so agents don't need to worry about the future. They don't look
ahead and they don't speculate. This simplies matters enormously but
comes at the heavy cost that the theory is powerless to deal with temporal
change. Another limitation to the theory so far is that agents only trade
goods. In the real world they trade stocks and bonds and other nancial
securities. Financial equilibrium extends general equilibrium to allow for
time, uncertainty, and nancial securities.
Uncertainty about the future is modeled in terms of states of nature that
unfold as the nodes in a tree [6, 43]. Each state represents the condition of
things like the weather or political events whose future behavior is unknown,
but exogenous to the economy. States are given, and while they can aect
the economy, the economy does not aect them. A change in the state of
nature is often called a shock. The agents in the economy do not know the
future states of nature, but they do know the tree from which the future
states of nature are drawn and the probability for reaching each node. For
example, suppose we assume that the dividends of an agricultural company
are made once a year and take on only one of two possible values, \high"
or \low", depending on the weather that year. Then we can organize these
as a binary tree in which the nth level with 2n nodes corresponds to the
nth year in the future, and a path from the beginning to the end of the
tree corresponds to a particular sequence of high and low dividends.1 If
the situation was more complicated so that we had to separate the weather
in the western hemisphere from the eastern hemisphere, then each node
would have four branches instead of two and there would be 4n paths. The
agents assign probabilities to each branch of the tree, giving a probability
for reaching each node and thus a probability measure on the terminal states
in the tree.
Financial models also extend the notion of equilibrium by generalizing
the notion of what can be traded to include securities, which are promises
to deliver certain goods at certain points in time. Such promises can be
contingent on future states of nature. Examples are stocks (which promise
future dividends that change depending on the prots of the rm), bonds
(which promise the same amount each period over a xed maturity) and so
on. The existence of such securities is important because it allows agents
to decrease their risk. It also allows them to speculate in ways that they
might not otherwise be able to. The implication of such securities for social
welfare has proved to be highly controversial.
1Financial models can also be formulated with continuous states and/or in continuous
time.
9In the general equilibrium model each agent is aware of her total con-
sumption of every good, and makes her decisions in that context. That is
why every decision is a marginal decision: an increase in her consumption
of one good must be evaluated in light of the decrease in her consumption
of some other good that might be required to balance her budget. In the
nancial equilibrium extension we are describing, each agent is assumed to
be aware of what her consumption will turn out to be at every node, and
to compute her utility on that basis. One popular way to make that cal-
culation is to evaluate the utility of consumption at any given node exactly
as agents evaluated their utility of consumption in the general equilibrium
model (which is basically a special case of the nancial model with one
node). One could then multiply the utility of consumption at a given node
by the probability of ever reaching the node. Finally, one could discount
that number again (i.e. multiply it by a factor less than 1), depending on
how far away from the origin of the tree the node is, to account for the
impatience of consumers. Summing over all the nodes gives the expected
discounted utility of consumption. An agent who contemplates increasing
her consumption of some good in some node in the nancial model must
evaluate her utility in light of the decrease in the holding of some nancial
security that might then be required for her to balance her budget, includ-
ing the consequent loss of consumption in future states where that security
would have paid dividends.
2.3.2 Financial Equilibrium
Once the model is extended to allow for the tree of states of nature, and
the trading of securities, we need to extend the notion of equilibrium. This
is done by following principles (1 - 4) above. Prices must now be given at
every node of the tree. When agents optimize they must choose an entire
action plan contemplating what they will buy and sell at each node in the
tree; part of their contemplated trades will involve securities, and the other
part commodities.2 Any purchase at any node must be nanced by a sale
of equal value at the same node. The sale could be of other goods, or it
could be of securities. The market for securities, as well as for goods, must
clear at every node in the tree. Finally, the rational expectations hypothesis
becomes much more demanding: Agents are not only aware of the prices
2As the path of future states unfolds the agents will carry out the trades they antic-
ipated making on that path. Of course only one path will eventually materialize, and
the agents will never get a chance to implement the plans they had made for unrealized
branches.
10of all goods and securities today, but are also aware of how all the prices
depend on each node in the future.
2.4 Rational Expectations and Utility Maximization
Maximizing a utility function already embeds a large dose of rationality.
The utility function is dened over the entire consumption plan. The agents
are also presumed to know the tree of states of nature, and the probabilities
of every branch, and to correctly forecast the prices that will emerge at each
node if they get there. So when an agent stops to buy an apple today, she
does so only after considering what other fruit she will likely have for dinner,
how likely it is she will pass the same shop tomorrow, what else she could
spend the money on the day after tomorrow, and so on.
Not surprisingly, this rational utility maximization has received a great
deal of attention and has been attacked from many dierent directions. In
2002 Kahneman received a Nobel prize for showing that real people do not
have simple utility functions such as those that are typically assumed in stan-
dard economic theory, but instead have preferences that depend on context
and even on framing, i.e. on the way things are presented [91]. The eld
of behavioral economics, which Kahneman exemplies, investigates psycho-
logically motivated modications of the rationality and utility assumptions.
There are a range of levels at which one can do this. At the opposite ex-
treme from rational expectations, one can simply assume that agents have
xed beliefs, which might or might not correspond to reality [24, 25, 26].
At an in-between level one can use a so-called noise trader model in which
some agents have xed beliefs while others are perfectly rational [143, 44].
(This can actually make the task of computing the equilibrium even harder,
since the rational agents have to have perfect models of the noise traders as
well as of each other). At a higher level one can assume that agents are not
given the probabilities of states of nature a priori, but need to learn them
[142, 162].
2.5 Extensions of Equilibrium
The rational expectations equilibrium model that we have described so far is
highly idealized, and in the next sections we will present a critique outlining
its problems. The main agenda of current economic theory is to extend it by
modifying or generalizing the assumptions. For example, in 1958 Samuel-
son extended the nite tree equilibrium model to an innite number of time
periods, calling it the overlapping generations model, in order to study inter-
11generational issues like social security. In 2001 Akerlof, Spence and Stiglitz
received the Nobel prize for their work on asymmetric information, i.e. for
studying situations such as buying a used car, or negotiations between labor
and management, in which the information sets of agents dier [1, 155, 157].
Another signicant extension is to allow agents who sell securities to default
on delivering the dividends those securities promise [49, 72]. This raises
interesting problems such as how the market determines the amount of col-
lateral that must be put up for loans [73].
In view of all these extensions the meaning of the word \equilibrium"
is not always clear. One denition would be any model that could be in-
terpreted as satisfying hypotheses (1 - 4) as described in the introduction
to this Section. But we also wish to allow for some boundedly rational
agents. Following the practice of most economists, we will dene an equi-
librium model as one in which at least some agents maximize preferences
and incorporate expectations in a self-consistent manner. So, for example,
a noise trader model is an equilibrium model as long as some of the agents
are rational, but models in which all the agents act according to xed beliefs
are not equilibrium models.
3 Eciency
In equilibrium everyone is acting in his own selsh interest, guided only
by the market prices, without any direction from a central planner. One
wonders if anything coherent can come from this decentralization of control.
One might expect coordination failures and other problems to arise. If
activities were organized by rational cooperation, surely people could be
made better o. Yet in the general equilibrium model of Arrow and Debreu,
equilibrium allocations are always allocatively ecient. Allocative eciency
means that the economy is as productive as possible, or Pareto ecient, i.e.
that there is no change in production choices and trades that would make
everyone better o. In equilibrium everyone acts in his own selsh interest,
yet the decisions they make are in the common good in the sense that not
even a benevolent and wise dictator who told everyone what to produce and
what to trade could make all the agents better o.
In nancial equilibrium the situation is much more complicated and in-
teresting. An important assumption underpinning much of the theory of
nancial economics is that of complete markets. The markets are complete
if at any node in the tree it is possible to oset any future risk, dened as
a particular future state, by purchasing a security that pays if and only if
12that state occurs. When all such securities exist and markets are complete,
nancial equilibrium is also Pareto ecient.3
In contrast, when markets are not complete, nancial equilibrium is al-
most never Pareto ecient. Worse still, the markets that do exist are not
used properly. When markets are incomplete, a benevolent and wise dictator
can almost always make everyone better o simply by taxing and subsidizing
the existing security trades [75]. What form such government interventions
should take is a matter for economic policy. Is it a good approximation
to assume that real markets are complete? If they are not complete, does
the government have enough information to improve the situation? These
questions have been a matter of considerable debate.
Since allocative eciency typically fails for nancial economies, economists
turned to properties of security prices that must always hold. Informa-
tional eciency is the property that security prices are in some sense un-
predictable. In its strongest form, informational eciency is the simple
statement that prices are a martingale [57, 58], i.e. that the current price is
the best prediction of future prices.4 This is important because it suggests
that all the information held in the economy is revealed by the prices. If
weather forecasts cannot improve on today's price in predicting future or-
ange prices, then one can say that today's orange price already incorporates
those forecasts, even if many traders are unaware of the forecasts.5 Arbi-
trage eciency means that through buying and selling securities it is not
possible for any trader to make prots in some state without taking any risk
(i.e. without losing money in some other state). Again this is important be-
cause it suggests that there are no traders who can always beat the market
by taking advantage of less informed traders. Thus the uninformed should
not feel afraid that they are not getting a fair deal. Informational eciency
and arbitrage eciency are intimately related; in some contexts they are
equivalent.
A consequence of the martingale property is that the price of every
3Brock, Hommes and Wagener have shown that when one deviates from rational ex-
pectations, for example by assuming agents use reinforcement learning, adding additional
securities can destabilize prices [23]. This suggests that there are situations where market
completeness can actually decrease utility.
4More precisely, if no security pays a dividend in period t+1, then there is a probability
measure on the branches out of any node in period t such that the expected price in period
t + 1 of any security (relative to a xed security), given its (relative) price in period t, is
just the period t price.
5Roll found in some Florida counties that today's orange prices predicted tomorrow's
orange prices better than today's weather reports, and also that today's orange prices
predicted tomorrow's weather better than today's weather forecasts [138].
13(nitely-lived) asset must be equal to its fundamental value (also called
present value if there is no uncertainty). The fundamental value of an asset
is the discounted expected dividend payments of the asset over its entire
life, where the expectation is calculated according to the martingale proba-
bilities, and the discount is the risk free rate (the interest rate on securities
such as treasury bonds for which the chance of default can be takent to be
zero). This is important for investors who might feel too ignorant to buy
stocks, because it suggests that on average everybody will get what he pays
for.
From the point of view of nance, arbitrage eciency and informational
eciency are particularly useful because they can be described without any
explicit assumptions about utility. Many results in nance can be derived
directly from arbitrage eciency. For example, the Black-Scholes model for
pricing options is perhaps the most famous model in nance. The option
price can be derived from only two assumptions, namely that the price of the
underlying asset is a random walk and that neither the person issuing the
option nor the person buying it can make risk-free prots. Because it does
not rely on utility, several people have suggested that arbitrage eciency
forms a better basis for nancial economics than equilibrium; see for example
Ross [139]. As we will argue later, due to all the problems with dening
utility, this is a highly desirable feature.
4 The virtues of equilibrium
4.1 Agent Based Modeling
Equilibrium theory focuses on individual actions and individual choices. By
contrast Marx emphasized class struggles, without asking whether each indi-
vidual in a class would have the incentive to carry on the struggle. Similarly
Keynesian macroeconomics often posited reduced form relationships, such
as the positive correlation between unemployment and ination (called the
Phillips curve), without deriving them from individual actions. Equilibrium
theory is an agent based approach which does not admit any variables except
those that can be explained in terms of individual choices.
The advantages of the agent based approach can be seen in the macroe-
conomic correlation between ination and output. At its face, such a corre-
lation suggests that the monetary authority can stimulate increased output
by engineering higher ination through printing money. According to equi-
librium theory, if ination causes higher output, there must be an agent
based explanation. For example, it may be that workers see their wages
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the goods they will want to buy are also going up so that there is no real
incentive to work harder. But if that is the explanation, then it becomes
obvious that policy makers will not be able to rely on the Phillips curve to
stimulate output by printing more money. Agents will eventually catch on
that when their wages are rising, so are general prices.6 That skepticism was
validated during the stagation of the 1970s, when there was higher ina-
tion and lower output. If printing money sometimes causes higher output,
it must be through a dierent channel, connected say to interest rates and
liquidity constraints. Finding what these are at the agent level deepens the
analysis and brings it closer to reality.
4.2 The need to take human reasoning into account
The fundamental dierence between economics and physics is that atoms
don't think. People are capable of reasoning and of making strategic plans
that take each other's ability to reason into account. Ultimately any eco-
nomic model has to address this problem. By going to a logical extreme,
equilibrium models provide a way to incorporate reasoning without having
to confront the messiness of real human behavior. Even though this ap-
proach is obviously unrealistic, the hope is that it may nonetheless be good
enough for many purposes.
4.3 Parsimony
4.3.1 Rationality
The rationality hypothesis is a parsimonious description of the world that
makes strong predictions. Rational expectations equilibrium models have
the advantage that agent expectations are derived from a single, simple
and self-consistent assumption. Without this assumption one needs to con-
front the hard task of determining how agents actually think, and how they
think about what others think. This requires formulating a model of cog-
nition or learning, and thereby introducing additional assumptions that are
usually complicated and/or ad hoc. Without rationality one needs either
to introduce a set of behavioral rules of thumb or to introduce a learning
model. While perfect rationality denes a unique or nearly unique model of
the world, there are an innite number of boundedly rational models. To
paraphrase Christopher Sims, once we depart from perfect rationality, there
6This has come to be called the Lucas critique [112].
15are so many possible models it is easy to become lost in the wilderness of
bounded rationality [151].
Perfect rationality is an impossible standard for any individual to attain,
but the hope of the economist in making a rational expectations model is
that in aggregate, people behave \as if" they were rational. This may be
true in some situations, and it may not be true in others. In any case, ratio-
nal expectations models can provide a useful benchmark for understanding
whether or not people are actually rational, which can serve as a starting
point for more complicated models that take bounded rationality into ac-
count.
4.3.2 Succinctness
Equilibrium theory provides a unifying framework from which many dier-
ent conclusions can be drawn. Rather than having to invent a new method
to attack each problem, it provides a standardized approach, and a stan-
dardized language in which to explain each conclusion.
A standardized model does not rule out new theories. New equilibrium
theories are of two forms. First, one can specialize the class of utilities, tech-
nologies, and endowments to try to draw a sharp and interesting conclusion
that does not hold in general. If either the premise or conclusion can be
empirically validated, one has found a law of economics. Second, one can
extend the denition of equilibrium (adding say asymmetric information or
default). The second form facilitates the discovery of many theories of the
rst form. Agreement on a unifying framework, such as equilibrium and
hypotheses (1 - 4), makes it easier to evaluate new economic theories, and
to make progress on applications. But of course it stulties radically new
approaches.
4.4 The normative purpose of economics
One of the principal dierences between physical and social science is that
the laws of the physical world are xed, whereas the laws of society are
malleable. As human beings we have the capacity to change the world we
live in. Economics thus has a normative as well as a descriptive purpose.
A descriptive model describes the world as it is, while a normative model
describes the world as it might be under a change in social institutions. The
equilibrium model is meant to allow us to describe both. For each arrange-
ment of social institutions, such as those that prevail today, we compute
the equilibrium. The representation of agents by utilities (as well as endow-
16ments) enables us to evaluate the benets to each person of the resulting
equilibrium, and thereby implicitly the utility of the underlying institutions.
Equilibrium theory then recommends the institutions that lead to the high-
est utilities. By contrast, consider a purely phenomenological model that
assumes behavioral rules for the agents without deriving them from util-
ity. Such a model is either silent on policy questions, or requires a separate
ad hoc notion of desireability in order to recommend one institution over
another.
The rationality hypothesis allows us to dene equilibrium succinctly. But
as a byproduct it shapes the economist's evaluation of the institutions. For
example, one of the basic questions in economics is whether free markets
organize ecient sharing of risks, leading to sensible production decisions.
The equilibrium model is often used to show that under certain conditions,
free market incentives lead selsh individuals to make wise social decisions.
We called this allocative eciency or Pareto eciency. But of course the
rationality of all the individuals is an indispensable hypthesis in the proof. If
agents are misinformed about future production possibilities, or act whim-
sically, the free market economy will obviously make bad decisions.
Even if rational expectations doesn't provide a good model of the present,
it may sometimes provide a good model of the future. The introduction
of an equilibrium model can change the future for the simple reason that
once people better understand their optimal strategies they may alter their
behavior. A good example of this is the Black-Scholes model; as people
began using it to buy and sell mispriced options, the prices of options more
closely matched its predictions. Another example is the capital asset pricing
model. In that model the optimal strategy for every investor is to hold a
giant mutual fund of all stocks. Nowadays every investor who has learned a
little nance does indeed think rst of holding exactly such an index (though
few investors hold only that).
Unfortunately, many economists have used the normative purpose of
economics as an excuse to construct economic theories that are so far re-
moved from reality that they are useless. For an economic theory to have
useful normative value it must be suciently close to reality to inspire con-
dence that its conclusions give useful advice. Unless a theory can give
some approximation of the world as it is, it is hard to have condence in its
predictions of how the world might be.
174.5 Why does Wall Street like the equilibrium model?
Many Wall Street professionals try to beat the market by actively looking
for arbitrages. Fundamental analysts, for example, believe that they can
nd stocks whose prices dier substantially from their fundamental values.
Statistical arbitrageurs believe they can nd information in previous stock
movements that will help them predict the relative direction of future stock
movements. The activities of these Wall Street professionals seems proof
that they think the equilibrium model is awed. If they believe the market
is in equilibrium, why are they pursuing strategies that cannot succeed in
equilibrium?
Ironically, in xed income and derivative asset markets the arbitrageurs
themselves use the apparatus of equilibrium models to nd arbitrages. Many
people make good prots by betting that when prices make large deviations
from equilibrium these deviations will eventually die out and return to equi-
librium.
There are many ways Wall Street practitioners use equilibrium models.
We review some of them below:
4.5.1 Conditional forecasting is good discipline
Many pundits, and even some professional economists (and especially macroe-
conomists), make unconditional forecasts. They say growth next quarter
will be slow, but by the fourth quarter it should pick up and unemploy-
ment should start to decline. They do not often bother to say, for example,
that their predictions might change if there is a messy war in Iraq. In the
equilibrium model agents do not know what state will prevail tomorrow,
but they do know what prices will prevail conditional on tomorrow's state.
They make conditional forecasts. To do this they construct a tree of possible
states and compute the equilibrium in each state. Wall Street traders are
trained in business schools and economics departments across the country
to appreciate equilibrium models. Nowadays so many Wall Street traders
make conditional forecasts using concrete trees of future possibilities that
this assumption has become more plausible as a descriptive model of the
world.
One of the virtues of making conditional forecasts is that it stimulates
traders to nd strategies (called riskless arbitrages) that will work no matter
what the future holds. If one is lucky enough to nd a riskless arbitrage,
success is independent of the probabilities of the future states of nature.
In the real world riskless arbitrages are rare (as equilibrium theory says
18they should be). Most real arbitrageurs actually make their money with
risky arbitrages, and in this case the probabilities for branches of the tree
become important. The estimation errors that are inherent in estimating
these probabilities compound the risk. Not only might the future bring a
state in which money will be lost, but the trader might also underestimate
the probability of this state. But at least she can see the scenarios that con-
stitute the model explicitly, and can compute the sensitivity of her expected
prots to variations in the probabilities of these scenarios.
4.5.2 The power of the no-arbitrage hypothesis
Tree building is most useful when the future possibilities are easy to imagine,
when they are not too numerous to compute, and when there is a reliable
guide to their probabilities. The hypothesis of no-arbitrage drastically re-
duces the number of states, making the computation feasible, and often even
determines the probabilities.
One reason that nancial practitioners like the no arbitrage assumption
is because it makes things much simpler. Arbitrage eciency requires a con-
sistency between prices that drastically reduces the size of the hypothetical
tree. For example, a mortgage derivative trader might worry about future
interest rates of all maturities, including the overnight (i.e one day) rate, the
yearly rate, the ten year rate, and so on. If there are 20 such rates, and each
rate can take on 100 values, then each node in the tree will require 10020
branches! Using the overnight rate alone requires a much smaller tree with
only 100 branches from each node. The crucial point is that if the trader
assumes there will never be any arbitrage among interest rate securities of
dierent maturities in the future, then the smaller tree will be sucient to
recover all the information in the larger tree even for a trader who cares
about all the rates. Given the smaller tree and the probabilities of each
branch, the trader can deduce all the other future long rates, conditional
on the future overnight rates, without adding any new nodes to her tree.
(Today's two day discount, for example, can be deduced as the product of
today's one day discount and tomorrow's one day discount, averaged over
all possible values of the one day discount tomorrow). Furthermore, if the
trader assumes there is no arbitrage between current long maturity interest
rate securities and future short interest rate securities and current interest
rate options, then she can deduce the probabilities of each branch in the
smaller overnight interest rate tree.
The homage arbitrage traders pay to arbitrage eciency is the most
compelling evidence that in some respects it is true. Again we see the irony
19that the road to arbitrage comes from assuming no arbitrage.7
4.5.3 Risk reduction
Hedging refers to the process of reducing specic nancial risks. To hedge the
value of a particular security one creates a combination of other securities,
called a portfolio, that mimics the security that one wishes to hedge. By
selling this combination of securities one can cancel or partially cancel the
risk of buying the original security. Statistical arbitrageurs, for example, try
to make bets on the relative movements of stocks without making bets on
the overall movement of the stock market. The market risk can be hedged
by making sure that the total position is market neutral, i.e. that under a
movement of the market as a whole the value of the position is unaected.
This is typically done by maintaining constraints on the overall position,
but can also be done by selling a security, such as a futures contract on a
market index.
To properly hedge it is necessary to have a set of scenarios for the future.
Such scenarios can be represented by means of a tree, exactly as we described
for equilibrium models. Thus, the same structure we dened in order to
discuss equilibrium is central to hedging risks. Wall Street professionals are
very concerned about risks, and for this reason like the nancial framework
for understanding equilibrium.
Hedging and arbitrage are two sides of the same coin. In both hedging
and arbitrage, the trader looks for a portfolio of securities that will pay
o exactly what the risky asset does. By buying the asset and selling the
portfolio, the trader is completely hedged. If the trader discovers that the
cost of the hedging portfolio is more than the security, then hedging becomes
arbitrage: The arbitrageur can buy the security and sell the portfolio and
lock in a riskless prot.
5 Diculties and limitations of equilibrium
While equilibrium should be an important component of the economist's
tool kit, its dangers and limitations need to be understood (and all too
often are not).
7The mortgage trader assumes no arbitrage in the class of interest rate securities alone.
By contrast, she does assume there is an arbitrage involving interest rate securities and
mortgage securities. A mortgage derivative trader might assume there is no arbitrage
involving interest rate securities and mortgage securities, but that there is an arbitrage
once mortgage derivatives are added to the mix.
205.1 Falsiability?
Empirical laws in economics are much harder to nd than in physics or the
other natural sciences. Realistic experiments for the economy as a whole
are nearly impossible to conduct (though for some small scale phenomena
there is a thriving experimental research eort underway) and many causal
variables are impossible to measure or even to observe. Economists usually
do not dream of nding \constants of behavior," analogous to the constants
of nature found in physics; when they do, they do not expect more than a
couple of signicant digits.8 We shall argue later that this may be a mistake,
and that it is possible to nd nely calibrated relationships in economic data.
Perhaps because of the diculty of empirical work, economic theory has
emphasized understanding over predictability. For example, to economists,
equilibrium theory itself is most important not for any empirical predictions,
but for the paradoxical understanding it provides for markets: Without any
centralized coordination, all individual plans can perfectly mesh; though
everyone is perfectly selsh, their actions promote the common good; though
everybody is spending lots of time haggling and negotiating over prices, their
behavior can be understood as if everybody took all the prices as given and
immutable.
Equilibrium theory has not been built with an eye exclusively focused
on testability or on nding exact functional forms. Most equilibrium models
are highly simplied at the sacrice of features such as temporal dynamics
or the complexities of institutional structure. When it comes time to test
the model, it is usually necessary to make auxiliary assumptions that put
in additional features that are outside of the theory. All these factors make
equilibrium theories dicult to test, and mean that many of the predictions
are not as sharp as they seem at rst. In many situations, whether or not the
predictions of equilibrium theory agree with reality remains controversial,
even after decades of debate.
Not only are there few sharp economic predictions to test, but the hy-
potheses of economic equilibrium also seem questionable, or hard to observe.
A long-standing dispute is whether utility is a reasonable foundation for eco-
nomic theory. The concept of utility as it is normally used in economic the-
ory is purely qualitative. The functional form of utility is generally chosen
for convenience, without any empirical justication for choosing one form
over another. No one takes the functional form and the parameters of utility
functions literally. This creates a vagueness in economic theory that remains
8Okun's Law for example, which states that every 1% increase in unemployment is
accompanied by a 3% decrease in GNP, has one signicant digit.
21in its predictions.
Psychologists have generally concluded that utility is not a good way
to describe preferences, and have proposed alternatives, such as prospect
theory [91]. Some economists have taken this seriously, as evidenced by the
recent Nobel prize awarded to Kahneman. However, most theory is still
built around conventional utility functions, and so far the alternatives are
not well-integrated into the mainstream. Attempts that have been made to
develop economic models based on prospect theory still do not determine
the parameters a priori (and in fact they have more free parameters). Thus
so far it is still not clear whether more general notions of preferences can be
used to make sharper and more quantitative economic predictions.9
The other big problem that is intrinsic to equilibrium theories concerns
expectations about the probabilities of future states. It is dicult to measure
expectations. In practice we only observe a single path through the tree
of future states. The particular path that is observed historically may be
atypical, and may not be a good indication of what agents really believed
when they made their decisions. Thus, even when we have a good historical
record there is plenty of room to debate the conclusions.
All these problems occur in testing the assertion that markets are ar-
bitrage ecient, as we discuss later. Real arbitrages are rarely risk free.
Instead, they involve risk, and determining whether one arbitrage is better
than another involves measuring risk. Future risks may not match histori-
cal risks. If a skillful trader produces excess returns (above and beyond the
market as a whole) with a high level of statistical signicance, a champion of
market eciency can always argue that this was possible only because the
asset had \unobserved risk factors". What seems like a powerful scientic
prediction from one point of view can look suspiciously like an unfalsiable
belief system from another.
5.2 Parsimony and tractability are not the same
While we have argued that equilibrium models are parsimonious this does
not necessarily mean that they are easy to use. The mathematical machinery
required to set up and solve an equilibrium model can be cumbersome.
Finding xed points is much more dicult than iterating dynamic maps.
Thus incorporating equilibrium into a model comes at a large cost, and
may force one to neglect other factors, such as the real structure of market
9One approach that has gained some attention is hyperbolic discounting [16]. Hyper-
bolic agents care a lot more about today than tomorrow, yet they act today as if they will
never care about the dierence between 30 days from today and 31 days from today.
22institutions. As a result of this complexity most equilibrium models end
up being qualitative toy models, formulated over one or two time periods,
whose predictions are too qualitative to be testable.
5.3 Realism of the rationality hypothesis?
It seems completely obvious that people are not rational. The economic
model of rationality not only requires them to be super-smart, it requires
them to have God-like powers of omniscience. This should make anyone
skeptical that such models can ever describe the real world. Rational ex-
pectations (i.e. knowing the probabilities of each branch in the tree and
knowing what the prices will be at each node) is often justied by the ar-
gument that people behave \as if" they were rational. Skeptics do not nd
such arguments convincing, particularly without supporting empirical evi-
dence. There are many reasons to be suspicious of equilibrium models, and
many situations where the cognitive tasks involved are suciently compli-
cated that the a priori expectation that an equilibrium theory should work
is not high.
The conceptual problems with perfect rationality can be broken down
into several categories:
 Omniscience. To take each others' expectations into account agents
must have an accurate model of each other, including the cognitive
abilities, utility, and information sets of all agents. All agents construct
and solve the same tree. They must also agree on the probabilities of
the branches. More realistically one must allow for errors in model
building, so that not all agents have the same estimates or even the
same tree of possibilities.
 Excessive cognitive demands. The cognitive demands the equilibrium
model places on its agents can be preposterous in the sense that the
calculations the agents need to make are extremely time consuming to
perform. Even given the tree and the probabilities and the conditional
prices, it may be dicult for an agent to compute her optimal plan.
But how does the agent know the conditional prices unless she herself
computes the entire equilibrium based on her knowledge of all the other
agents' utilities and endowments? These computational problems can
be intractable even if all agents are fully rational, and they can become
even worse if some agents are rational and others aren't.
 Behavioral anomalies. There is pervasive evidence of irrationality in
23both psychological experiments and real world economic behavior.
Even in simple situations where people should be able to deal with
the diculties of computing an equilibrium it seems many do not do
so [13, 160].
 Modeling cognitive cost and heterogeneity. Real agents have highly
diverse and context dependent notions of rationality. Because models
are expensive to create real agents take shortcuts and ignore lots of
information. They use specialized strategies. The resulting set of
decisions may be far from the rationality supposed in equilibrium,
even when taken in aggregate.
5.4 Limited scope
There are many interesting problems in nancial economics that the equi-
librium framework was never intended to solve. Under conditions that are
rapidly evolving, e.g. where there is insucient time for agents to learn
good models of the situation they are placed in, there is little reason to
believe that the equilibrium framework describes the real world. Some of
the problems include
 Evolution of knowledge. In a real market setting the framework from
which we view the world is constantly and unpredictably evolving. The
models used by traders to evaluate mortgage securities in the 1980s
were vastly more primitive than the models used to evaluate the same
securities today. People have a dicult time imagining the possible
ways in which knowledge will evolve, much less assigning probabilities
to all of its states.
 Lack of tatonnement. The fact that an equilibrium exists does not
necessarily imply that it is stable. For stability it is necessary to show
that when a system starts out of equilibrium it will necessarily move
toward equilibrium. This requires the construction of a model for price
formation out of equilibrium, a process that is called tatonnement.
Such models suggest that there are many situations where prices will
fail to converge to equilibrium [66].
 Inability to model deviations from itself. Equilibrium can't model de-
viations from itself. It provides no way to pose questions such as \How
ecient is the economy?". One would like to be able to understand
questions such as the timescale for violations of arbitrage eciency to
24disappear, but such questions are inherently outside of the equilibrium
framework. (See the discussion in Section 7).
While the nancial implications of equilibrium theory are on one hand
extraordinarily powerful, on the other hand, their very power makes them
almost empty. Economic theory says that there is very little to know about
markets: An asset's price is the best possible measure of its fundamental
value, and the best predictor of future prices. If that is true, there is no need
to answer the kinds of questions that economists are asked all the time, such
as \Are stocks going up or down?", or \Is this a good time to invest in real
estate?". Only by going outside the equilibrium model can one raise many
pressing nancial questions.
It is worth noting that the mere fact that people so persistently ask such
questions puts equilibrium theory into doubt. There are three possibilities:
Either the people that do this are irrational, but if they are, then how can
we expect equilibrium theory to describe them? Or they are rational, but if
so, then their questions reect that their understanding is deeper than that
of the equilibrium theorist. The only other explanation is that the people
who ask such questions do not invest an economically signicant amount of
money. But this seems implausible { almost everyone asks such questions.
6 Empirical evidence for and against
Equilibrium theory teaches us that expectations are important, and this is
no less true in evaluating the success or failure of equilibrium theory itself.
The booster can point to signicant successes and the detractor can point
to signicant failures.
The booster can assert that equilibrium theory has made many practical
suggestions that have been followed and have been borne out as correct.
Communism did not produce as much output as the free markets of capi-
talism. Diversifying your investments really is a good idea, and many index
funds have been created to accommodate this desire. A hedge fund that
can show its returns are independent of much of the rest of the economy
can attract investors even if it promises a lower rate of return than com-
petitors whose returns are highly correlated with the market.10 Arbitrages
are indeed hard to nd, and even harder to exploit. Stock option prices are
10Though diversication is often sighted as evidence for equilibrium theory, the skeptic
will point out that this only depends on portfolio theory, which is a simple result from vari-
ational calculus concerning statistical estimation and has nothing to do with equilibrium
theory.
25explained to a high degree of accuracy by the Black-Scholes formula. Pre-
payment behavior for prime mortgages can be explained by maximizing the
utility of individual households (with some allowances for inattention and
other irrational behaviors).
The skeptic counters that, with a few exceptions, most of the predic-
tions of equilibrium theory are qualitative and have not been strongly borne
out empirically in an unambiguous manner. To quote Ijiri and Simon: \To
be sure, economics has evolved a highly sophisticated body of mathemati-
cal laws, but for the most part these laws bear a rather distant relation to
empirical phenomena, and usually imply only qualitative relations among
observables ... Thus, we know a great deal about the direction of movement
of one variable with the movement of another, a little about the magnitudes
of such movement, and almost nothing about the functional forms of the
underlying relations" [88]. Since they said this in 1977 the situation has
improved, but only a little. Apart from options and prime mortgage pricing
(but not subprime), there are very few examples of economic theories that
cleanly t the data and also unambiguously exclude nonequilibrium alterna-
tives. While some of the predictions of equilibrium models are in qualitative
agreement with the data, there are few that can be quantitatively veried
in a really convincing manner.
One of the conclusions of equilibrum theory is that relative prices should
follow a martingale. It is well documented that over the long term risky
securities like stocks have had higher returns than safe securities like short
term government bonds, at least in the United States.11 This would seem
to contradict the martingale pricing theorem. But the martingale pricing
theorem says only that asset prices follow a martingale with respect to some
probability measure, not necessarily with respect to the objective proba-
bilities. The skeptic naturally complains that this is giving the theory too
much freedom, making it close to tautological. Economists have responded
by making more assumptions on the underlying utilities in the equilibrium
model to limit how the set of allowable martingale probabilities can deviate
from objective probabilities, making the theory falsiable. The most famous
model of that type is the so-called capital asset pricing model (CAPM) de-
veloped by Markowitz, Tobin, Linter, and Sharpe [122, 163, 107, 145]. In
one version of CAPM all utilities are quadratic.12 Under this assumption the
11Brown, Goetzmann and Ross point out that averaged over all western countries, stocks
have not outperformed bonds [28]. An economic collapse, say during the Russian revolu-
tion, usually crushes stock prices more than bond prices. So the American experience may
not be representative. Of course this illustrates the diculty of testing the prediction.
12This is an example of the rst kind of progress equilibrium theory makes, in which
26martingale probabilities are not arbitrary, but must lie in a one dimensional
set, making the theory more straightforwardly testable. CAPM does explain
why riskier securities should have higher returns than safe securities, and
also provides a rigorous denition and quantication of the risk of a security.
Data from the 1930s through the 1960s seemed to conrm the CAPM theory
of pricing. But little by little the empirical validity of CAPM has unraveled.
Of course there is always the possibility that a dierent specialization will
give rise to another model that matches the data more closely. Or perhaps
an extension of the equilibrium model involving default and collateral will
be able to match the data, without creating so many free parameters as to
make the theory unfalsiable.13
A similar story can be told about the conclusion that asset prices should
match fundamental values. Attempts to independently compute fundamen-
tal values based on dividend series do not match prices very well. For ex-
ample, for the U.S. stock market Campbell and Shiller [30] show deviations
between prices and fundamental values of more than a factor of two over
periods as long as decades. This conclusion can be disputed on the grounds
that fundamental values are not easily measurable, and perhaps none of the
measures they use are correct (though they tried several alternatives). But
whether the theory is wrong or whether it is merely unfalsiable, the failure
to produce a good match to fundamental values represents a major aw in
either case.
Perhaps even worse, there are situations where equilibrium makes predic-
tions that appear to be false. For example, people seem to trade much more
than they should in equilibrium [144]. Global trading in nancial markets
is on the order of a hundred times as large as global production [148, 149].
If people are properly taking each others' expectations into account why
should they need to trade so much? One of the problems is that the theo-
retical predictions of how much people should trade are not very sharp, due
at least in part to the problems discussed in the previous section. Nonethe-
less, it seems that even under the most favorable set of assumptions people
trade far more than can be rationalized by an equilibrium model [131].
As already discussed in the previous section, one of the key principles of
rational expectations is that investors should correctly process information,
and thus price movements should occur only in response to new information.
specialized assumptions give rise to more precise conclusions, as we discussed in Section
4.3.2.
13If successful, this would be an example of the second kind of progress equilibrium the-
ory makes, when the model is extended to incorporate new concepts, but retains method-
ological premises 1-4, as we discussed in Section 4.3.2.
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not support this. For example, Cutler, Poterba and Summers examined the
largest 100 daily price movements in the S&P index during a 40 year period
and showed that most of the largest movements occur on days where there
is no discernable news, and conversely, days that are particularly newswor-
thy are not particularly likely to have large price movements [40]. Other
studies have shown that price volatility when markets are closed, even on
non-holidays, is much lower than when the market is open [69]. The evi-
dence seems to suggest that a substantial fraction of price changes are driven
by factors unrelated to information arrival. While news arrival and market
movements are clearly correlated, the correlation is not nearly as strong as
one would expect based on rational expectations. As asserted in the previ-
ous section, markets appear to make their own news. One of the problems in
answering this question empirically is that it is dicult to measure informa-
tion arrival{ \news" contains a judgement about what is important or not
important, and is dicult to objectively reduce to a quantitative measure.14
7 Motivation for non-equilibrium models: a few
examples
We begin by describing some empirical regularities in nancial data that
seem salient yet which equilibrium theory does not seem able to explain. Of
particular importance is price volatility. Not only do many people think that
prices change more than they should under equilibrium, but also volatility
displays an interesting temporal correlation structure that seems to be bet-
ter explained by nonequilibrium models. This correlation is an example of
a power law, a functional form that seems to underly many of the regular-
ities in nancial economics. In physics power laws can't be generated at
equilibrium and are a signature of nonequilibrium behavior. Economic and
physical equilibrium are quite dierent, however, as we try to make clear.
Statistical testing for power laws is dicult and the existence of power laws
and their relevance for economics have generated a great deal of debate,
which we briey review.
14Engle and Rangel [54] demonstrate that there is a positive correlation between low
frequency price volatility and macroeconomic fundamentals. Because their results involve
both a longtitudinal and a cross-sectional regression involving both developed and unde-
veloped countries the interpretation of the correlations that they observe are not obvious.
No one disputes that prices respond to information { the question is, \What fraction of
price movements can be explained by information?". Timescale is clearly critical, i.e. one
expects more correlation to information arrival at lower frequencies.
28Next we observe that one of the most frequently cited pieces of evidence
for equilibrium is that arbitrage opportunities tend to disappear. There
is substantial evidence that real markets are ecient at some level of ap-
proximation. But we present anecdotal evidence that eciencies disappear
surprisingly slowly. We would like a theory of the transition to equilibrium,
or of tatonnement as it has sometimes been called. We end this section with
a brief discussion of one of the most remarkable episodes in nancial markets
of the last ten years, which illustrates both the value and the limitations of
the equilibrium model.
7.1 Some economically important phenomena may not de-
pend on equilibrium
There are many empirically observed properties of markets that have so far
not been explained under the equilibrium framework. One famous example
is called clustered volatility. This refers to the fact that there are substantial
and strongly temporally correlated changes in the size of price movements
at dierent points in time [55]. If prices move a lot on a Tuesday, they will
probably move a lot the Wednesday after, and probably (but not as likely)
move a lot on Thursday.15. The hard core rational expectations booster
would say that there is nothing to explain. If the standard equilibrium the-
ory is correct, changes in price are caused by the receipt of new information,
so clustered volatility is simply a reection of non-uniform information ar-
rival. The rate of information arrival has to do with meteorology, sociology,
political science, etc. It is exogenous to nancial economics and so it is
someone else's job to explain it, if such a question is even interesting.
An alternative point of view is that, due to a lack of a perfect rational-
ity, the market is not in perfect equilibrium and thus prices do not simply
passively reect new information. Under this view the market acts as a non-
linear dynamical system: agents process information via decision-making
rules that respond to prices and other inputs, and prices are formed as a
result of agent decisions. Since this information processing is imperfect, the
resulting feedback loop amplies noise. As a result a signicant component
of volatility is generated by the market itself. This point of view is sup-
15Mandelbrot and Clark suggest that it is possible to describe clustered volatitlity as
if time gradually speeds up and slows down, according to some random process that is
independent of the direction of prices [119, 120, 37]. It has also been suggested that
the correct notion of trading time can be measured by either transaction volume or fre-
quency of transactions [5]; more careful analysis reveals that this is not correct, and that
uctuations of volume are dominated by uctuations in liquidity [77].
29ported by the fact that there are now many examples of non-equilibrium
models that generate clustered volatility, and in some cases there is a good
match to empirical data. For many of these models it is possible to include
equilibrium as a special case; when this is done the overall volatility level
drops and clustered volatility disappears (see Section 8.3). Another relevant
point is that volatility is widely believed to exhibit long-memory, which we
discuss shortly in the section on power laws.
Since the discussion of properties of markets that are not currently
explained by equilibrium makes more sense in the context of alternative
models, we will return to review this in more depth when we discuss non-
equilibirum heterogeneous agent models in Section 8.3. As we discuss in
the next section, the questions of when equilibrium theory is irrelevant or
simply wrong can blur together.
7.2 Power laws
As we already mentioned, clustered volatility and many other phenomena
in economics are widely believed to display power laws. Loosely speaking, a
power law is a relationship of the form y = kx, where k and  are constants,
that holds for asymptotic values of a variable x, such as x ! 1 [130, 61].
The rst observation of a power law (in any eld) was made by Pareto, who
claimed that this functional form t the distribution of the incomes of the
wealthiest people in many dierent countries [133]. Power laws are reported
to occur in many aspects of nancial economics, such as the distribution of
large price returns16 [119, 56, 132, 2, 96, 111, 121, 110, 113, 127, 135, 136, 80],
the size of transactions [81, 105], the autocorrelation of volatility [45, 22, 83,
11, 18, 109] the prices where orders are placed relative to the best prices
[21, 168, 126], the autocorrelation of signs of trading orders [19, 20, 103, 59],
the growth rate of companies [156, 4, 134], and the scaling of the price
impact of trading with market capitalization [104]. The empirical evidence
for power laws in economics and their relevance for economic theory remains
controversial [50]. But there is a large literature claiming that power laws
exist in economics and unless one is willing to cast aside this entire literature,
it seems a serious problem that there is no explanation based on equilibrium.
This problem might be resolved in one of several ways: Either as in
physics, (1) power laws represent nonequilibrium phenomena from an eco-
nomic point of view and thus provide a motivation for nonequilibrium theory,
16Under time varying volatility the distribution of returns can be interpreted as a mix-
ture of normal distributions with varying standard deviations. This generically fattens
the tails, and for the right distribution of standard deviations can produce a power law.
30or (2) power laws are consistent with economic equilibrium, but still need
to be explained by some other means, or (3) equilibrium is a key concept in
understanding power laws but we just don't know how to do this yet. Or
perhaps the existence of power laws is just an illusion. But it seems that
power laws t the data to at least a reasonable degree of approximation.
Furthermore, there are many non-equilibrium models that naturally gener-
ate power laws, and for such models it is easy to test that the phenomena
they generate are indeed real power laws.
It may seem strange to single out a particular functional form for special
attention. There are several reasons for viewing power laws as important.
One of them comes from extreme value theory [52], which says that in a
certain sense there are only four possible convergent forms for the tail of
a probability distribution17, and power laws are one of them. The main
motivation for looking at tail distributions is that they provide a clue to
underlying mechanisms: dierent mechanisms or behaviors tend to generate
dierent classes of tail distributions.
Statistically classifying a tail distribution is inherently dicult because
one does not know a priori where the tail begins. In extreme value theory
a power law is more precisely stated as a relation of the form y = K(x)x,
where K(x) is a slowly varying function. A slowly varying function K(x)
satises limx!1 K(tx)=K(x) = 1, for every positive constant t: There is a
great variety of possible slowly varying functions; with a nite amount of
data it is only possible to probe to a nite value of x and the slowly varying
function may converge slowly. In practice one tends to look for a threshhold
x beyond which the points (logx;logy) almost lie on a straight line. (This
can be made precise using maximum likelihood estimation, including the
estimation of the threshold x [38]).
In the last twenty years or so the phenomenon of power laws has received
a great deal of attention in physics. Power laws are special because they are
self-similar, i.e. under a scale change of the dependent variable x0 = cx,
treating K as a constant, the function f(x0) = cf(x) remains a power law
with the same exponent  but a modied scale K0 = cK. One of the
places where power laws are widespread is at phase transitions, such as the
point where a liquid changes into a solid. Self-similarity proved to be a
powerful clue to understanding the physics of phase transitions and led to
17The four possible tail behaviors of probability distributions correspond to distribu-
tions with nite support; thin tailed distributions such as Gaussians, exponentials or
log-normals; distributions where there is a critical cuto above which moments don't exist
(namely power laws); and distributions that lack any regular tail behavior at all. Almost
all commonly used distributions are in one of the rst three categories.
31the development of the renormalization group, which made it possible to
compute the properties of phase transitions precisely. The main assumption
of the renormalization group is that the physics is invariant across dierent
scales, i.e. the reason the observed phenomena are power laws is because
their underlying physics is self-similar. This is an important clue about
mechanism.
In physics power laws are associated with nonequilibrium behavior and
are viewed as a possible signature of non-equilibrium dynamics [130, 61,
65]. It was shown more than 100 years ago by Boltzmann and Gibbs that
in physical equilibrium, energies obey an exponential distribution; thus a
power law indicates nonequilibrium behavior. As discussed in Section 7.4,
equilibrium in physics is quite dierent from equilibrium in economics, but
it seems telling that the current set of nancial models in which power laws
appear are (economic) nonequilibrium models, as discussed in Section 8.3.
7.3 The progression toward market eciency
The theory of market (arbitrage) eciency is justied by the assertion that
if there were prot making opportunities in markets, they would be quickly
found and exploited, and the resulting trading activity would change prices
in ways that would remove them. But is this really true? Anecdotal em-
pirical evidence suggests otherwise, as illustrated in Figure 1, where we plot
the performance of two proprietary predictive trading signals developed by
Prediction Company (where one of the authors was employed). The perfor-
mance of the signals is measured in terms of their correlation to future price
movements on a two week time scale over a twenty three year period18. In
the case of signal 1 we see a gradual degradation in performance over the
twenty three year period. The correlation to future prices is variable but
the overall trend is clear. At the beginning of the period in 1975 it averages
about 14% and by 1998 it has declined to roughly 4%. Nonetheless, even in
1998 the signal remains strong enough to be protably tradeable.
Does this evidence support market eciency? On one hand the answer
is yes: The usefulness of the signal declines with time. On the other hand
it is no: It takes at least 23 years to do this, and at the end of the period
the opportunity for prots remains present, even if greatly diminished. The
performance of signal 2 is even more surprising, and clearly does not support
18The signals were developed based on data from 1991 - 1998. Afterward data from
1975 - 1990 was acquired and the model was tested on this data without alteration. Thus
the earlier data is completely out of sample and the enhanced performance prior to 1991
cannot be due to overtting.
32Figure 1: The ineciency of the market with respect to two nancial strate-
gies over a 23 year period. The y axis plots the historical performance for a
backtest of two trading signals developed by Prediction Company. Perfor-
mance is measured in terms of the correlation of each signal to the movement
of stock prices two weeks in the future.
33market eciency. Due to a structural change in the market, signal 2 begins
in 1983 and subsequently grows in predictive power over the next decade
and a half. This is the opposite of what standard dogma about ecient
markets would suggest.
The need for a non-equilibrium theory is apparent. Equilibrium theory
predicts that markets are perfectly ecient, and thus violations of eciency
cannot be addressed without going outside it. The time scale for the degra-
dation of a protable strategy is an inherently disequilibium phenomenon.
An estimate of the time scale for the progression toward eciency can
be made by taking into account what is needed to learn a good model and to
acquire the capital to exploit it. Assume that there is a structural change in
the market, suddenly creating a new ineciency. For example, suppose that
lots of mortgages are pooled together and securitized for the rst time. On
account of lack of historical data or irrational fear (say of adverse selection),
the security might sell for a very low price. How long will this ineciency
take to disappear? Assume also that the only possible strategies for remov-
ing the ineciency are econometric, i.e. they are based purely on statistical
time series modeling. In this case one can approximate the rate at which the
strategy can be discovered and exploited based on its Sharpe ratio S, which
is dened as the ratio of the expected excess return of the strategy com-
pared to its risk as measured by the standard deviation of its prots. Under
the optimistic assumption that excess returns are normally distributed, the
statistical signicance with which an ineciency with Sharpe ratio S can
be detected is roughly S
p
t, where t is the time the ineciency has been
in existence. On an annual time scale a trading strategy with a Sharpe
ratio of one is considered highly desirable19. Thus to detect the existence
of an ineciency at two standard deviations of signicance requires four
years. Accumulating a statistically signicant track record based on live
trading, which is normally a prerequisite to raising capital, takes another
four years. We thus expect that the typical time scale before such strategies
become protable should be at least eight years20. One also has to address
the question of how prices are altered and what is required to make the
19The historical Sharpe ratio of the S&P index is about 0:4, and the Sharpe ratio of
many famous investors, such as Warren Buet or George Soros, is signicantly less than
one.
20There is always the possibility of conducting more sophisticated research to speed up
the learning time. Instead of observing the returns of the securitized MBS, one could nd
historical records of individual loan performance from before the securitization. But this
data is hard to get, and the partial data that can be obtained might not be selected in
the same way the securitized loans were.
34ineciency disappear. As investors start to recognize the opportunity and
exploit it they will make it shrink (say by bidding up the price of the mort-
gage backed security) and thus make it harder for others to see, extending
the time until its superior protability is completely extinguished [60]. In
any case this argument at least indicates that we should not be surprised
that ineciencies disappear slowly.
As originally pointed out by Milton Friedman, the idea of a fully ecient
market is inherently contradictory. In order to remove market ineciencies
we must have traders who are motivated to exploit them. But if the market
is perfectly ecient there is no possibility to make excess prots. While e-
ciency might be true at rst order, it cannot be true at second order: There
must be on-going violations of eciency that are suciently large to keep
traders motivated. Developing a theory capable of quantitatively explain-
ing this is a major challenge for economics, and a signicant motivation for
developing a non-equilibrium theory.
But what about signal 2 in Figure 1? In this case, the ineciency actu-
ally grows for a period of more than a decade. We believe this is an example
of a structural change. In fact the information available for constructing the
signal was not even available prior to 1983, and only became available after
a rule change in reporting. There are many examples of sudden structural
changes in markets, for example the introduction of a new derivative such
as a mortgage-backed security, a market for a new type of good such as an
internet company, or the introduction of a new technology such as comput-
ers that enables new nancial strategies such as program trading. When
the ongoing introduction of nancial innovations is combined with the slow
time scale for discovering such signals, perhaps the persistent existence of
ineciencies is not so surprising.
7.4 Equilibrium and non-equilibrium in physics and economics
To understand the motivations for non-equilibrium models, and to give some
insight into how this might be useful in economics, we make a comparison
with physics. The very name \non-equilibrium" indicates something that is
dened in terms of its opposite, so before we can discuss non-equilibrium
models in physics we have to make it clear what equilibrium means and how
it diers from the same concept in economics.
As in economics, the word equilibrium in physics has several meanings.
In mechanics the word \equilibrium" sometimes denotes the fairly trivial
notion that forces are balanced, so there is no acceleration. The more com-
mon use of the term is in thermodynamics or statistical mechanics, where
35the word \thermal equilibrium" means that two systems in thermal contact
reach the same temperature and cease to exchange energy by heat. A system
in equilibrium will experience no change when isolated from its surroundings,
and exists at the minimum of a thermodynamic potential. This is typically
a good approximation only when a system has been left undisturbed for a
suciently long period of time.
While the notion of equilibrium in physics is fundamentally dierent
from that in economics, it does have some similarities. Both involve the
simplifying assumption that the basic set up of the underlying situation
is not changing in time. In economic equilibrium this is implicit in the
sense that in order to imagine that rationality is a reasonable assumption
all agents must have time to make good models of the world. In practice
good models cannot be built without a learning period, in a setting that is
reasonably constant. In physics, equilibrium explicitly requires time inde-
pendence. Equilibrium in economics allows explicit time dependences, but
requires that agents have a full understanding of them.
To illustrate how non-equilibrium models are used in physics, suppose
you put a can of cold beer in a warm room. Heat initially ows from the
room into the beer { the system is out of equilibrium. With time the beer
gets warmer, and eventually to a good approximation the beer comes to
room temperature and the system is at equilibrium.
Equilibrium thermodynamics tells us some useful things, such as the
change in the pressure inside the can of beer between the time it is taken
out of the refrigerator and when it comes to room temperature. There are,
however, many things it doesn't tell us, such as how long will it take for
the beer to get warm. (The analogy to the problem of ineciencies in the
previous section should now be clear). From an empirical point of view, any-
one who drinks beer knows that on a hot day it will become unpleasantly
warm in less than an hour. A more quantitative, rst principles prediction
is possible using Fourier's law, which is a nonequilibrium principle stating
that the rate of change in temperature is proportional to the temperature
dierence between the beer and the room. This implies that the tempera-
ture of the beer converges to that of the room exponentially. This can be
derived from the heat equation (which is a standard diusion equation and
would look very familiar to nancial economists). Furthermore, by making
more detailed models it is possible to estimate the parameters of the dif-
fusion process, so that we can roughly estimate when the beer will become
too warm, even if we have no previous experience drinking beer in warm
36rooms.21 Thus we see that in physics, equilibrium theory only explains
part of what we need to know { to fully understand what is going on we
need a more detailed nonequilibrium theory that can explain the dynam-
ics of the transitions between equilibrium states. One important advantage
of a nonequilibrium theory is that it makes it possible to know when the
equilibrium theory is valid.
The fact that we have no similar disequilibrium theory in economics is
clearly a serious problem. If there were such a theory, we would know when
equilibrium applies and when it doesn't. There have been many attempts
to create such a theory. Examples can be found in Franklin Fisher's book,
Disequilibrium foundations of equilibrium economics [66]. This book reviews
a research program involving many prominent economists that attempted to
make models of the approach to equilibrium under the Walrasian framework.
They focused on the problem of tatonnement, i.e. the process by which
prices arrive at their equilibrium values. This body of theory was not very
successful. In retrospect the diculty was that the models required strong
and detailed assumptions about the market mechanism and the conclusions
that could be derived were not very general. This serves as a cautionary
tale. The hope for a new attempt is that we have new tools (the computer),
much better data, and perhaps a few new ideas.
Another often-used point of comparison between equilibrium in physics
and economics concerns power laws. As already mentioned, physical equi-
librium does not yield power laws. This can be explained fairly trivially:
Under the Jaynes formulation of statistical mechanics, deducing the correct
probability distribution of states is just a matter of maximizing entropy
subject to any imposed physical constraints, such as those that come from
conservation laws. So, for example, for a closed system with a xed number
of particles, conservation of energy is just a constraint on the mean energy,
and maximizing entropy subject to this constraint yields an exponential dis-
tribution of energies, which is not a power law. One can also work this out
in more general settings, e.g. when the energy or the number of particles
is not conserved, and a similar answer is obtained. It is not clear that this
pertains in economics. For example, doing the same calculation under a
constraint on the mean logarithm yields a power law; if there were economic
systems where this constraint were natural (e.g. due to the use of logarith-
mic utility), power laws might emerge naturally. And as we have already
21This is not at all trivial. The rate of heat transfer depends on the heat conductivity
of the can, on the convection properties of air, and several other factors. It is nonetheless
possible to make estimates based on rst principles.
37stressed, in any case the notions of equilibrium in economics and physics are
quite dierent.
7.5 The sub-prime mortgage crisis of 2007
As we are writing this in the late summer of 2007, a nancial crisis is unfold-
ing that provides a good illustration of the value of equilibrium models, at
the same time that it illustrates the need for non-equilibrium models. The
crisis began in sub-prime mortgages and appears to be spreading to seemi-
ingly unrelated sectors. This will take some time to understand completely,
but in cartoon form the crisis unfolded something like this:
 Low interest rates, a rising housing market, and condence in the risk-
reducing power of mortgage-backed securities led to a proliferation of
sub-prime mortgages, often under questionable terms.
 A drop in housing prices made it clear that many sub-prime borrowers
would eventually have to default.
 This stressed capital providers and caused them to tighten credit gen-
erally. One eect was that subprime borrowers themselves found it
harder to renance, which paradoxically created more defaults and
higher losses.
 Another eect is that the prices of companies that depend on credit
to do business were depressed.
 Institutions (including the largest banks in the United States) holding
AAA rated securities called CDOs backed by bonds which in turn
were backed by sub-prime mortgages lost something like $100 or $200
billion. Curiously these banks announced their losses piecemeal. One
week a bank would announce $10 billion of losses, the next week they
would add another $10 billion, then two weeks later another $10 billion.
 In mid August 2007, in the midst of the sub-prime mortgage crisis,
there was a sudden meltdown of many statistical arbitrage hedge funds
trading equities. Stocks held by these hedge funds made unusual but
systematic relative movements { stocks owned by these hedge funds
dropped in value, while those shorted by these funds rose in value22.
22This is based on anecdotal conversations with hedge fund managers. See also [93].
38 One popular explanation is that the institutions losing money in sub-
prime mortgages sold positions in other markets, including stocks held
by stat arb hedge funds. This caused the stat arb hedge funds to take
losses and to liquidate more stocks, causing more losses and more
liquidations.
 The President announced that the crisis might be leading the country
into a recession.
This crisis involves some phenomena that are inherently out of equilib-
rium. At the same time it shows the relevance of the equilibrium model.
The crisis was originally precipitated by levels of credit that are dicult
to justify as rational. Homeowners got several hundred thousand dollar
loans with no money down (i.e. the loan was equal to the appraisal value of
the house), and representations about income were taken at face value (i.e.
the income was not veried, but only stated by the homeowner himself).
While housing prices were rising, this caused no trouble. If the homeowner
did not pay, foreclosure could bring enough money to make the loan good,
or more common, its threat could induce the homeowner to renance into
another loan. As housing prices started to decline, homeowners who in fact
had no income could not pay, and foreclosures are not expected to yield
nearly enough cash to repay the loans.
As of this writing, the crisis is based entirely on expectations, including
expections about future home prices. The actual realized losses from foreclo-
sures so far have only been around 1%. The $250 billion loss that the banks
and hedge funds have been forced to take is based on the expectation that
eventually, in several years, 50% of the homeowners (2.5 million families)
will be thrown out of their houses with losses of 50 cents on the dollar for
each foreclosed loan.23 The equilibrium model is thus right to put so much
emphasis on the importance of expectations. We have yet to see whether
these expectations are rational.
One important contributing factor is that collateral levels have changed
dramatically. Before the crisis, one could get a sub-prime loan with almost
no money down. As the crisis developed, the required downpayment jumped
to 25%. Since most sub-prime borrowers have little free cash, this meant
that eectively the sub-prime mortgage market dried up overnight. In the
past, subprime borrowers who made 36 straight payments, demonstrating
they deserved a better credit rating, would renance into cheaper prime
23There is $1 trillion in outstanding subprime loans. Losses of 50%50%$1 trillion =
$250 billion.
39mortgages with nothing down. The renancing rate was over 70% cumu-
latively for these people. This is important because the subprime interest
rates typically reset to higher rates after 36 months. Now these same people
are being asked to put 25% down to renance into a new mortgage. Many
of these homeowners will not be able to renance, and they will eventu-
ally default, which will force further foreclosures, further depressing housing
prices.
The collateral tightening is spreading throughout the mortgage market.
Multibillion dollar hedge funds now have to put up twice as much cash to
buy mortgage derivatives as they had three months before (that is, instead
of borrowing 90% of the price using a mortgage derivative as collateral, they
can only borrow 80%).
A striking feature of the crisis is that the situation evolved rapidly and
appeared to be driven by emotion { the word \fear", which is not an equi-
librium concept, appeared in almost every newspaper article covering these
events.
The crisis underlined the role of specialized players: banks, mortgage
backed derivatives experts, stock funds using valuation models, and quants
building statistical arbitrage strategies. Key aspects are the heterogeneous
nature of the strategies and their linkages to each other through institutional
groupings and cross-market exposure.
Is the crisis a simple consequence of irrationality, completely orthogonal
to the equilibrium model? It is not possible that lenders were so foolish that
they did not imagine the possibility that housing prices might fall. But they
apparently underestimated the amount of fraud in the loans. The brokers
arranging the loans did not own them. The loans were sold and repackaged
into bonds that were in turn sold to hedge funds and other investors. Since
the brokers knew they would not bear the losses from defaulted loans, they
evidently did not have enough incentive to check the truthfulness of the bor-
rowers. And the investors apparently did not monitor the brokers carefully
enough, perhaps lulled by the good behavior of the loans during the period
of housing appreciation. There was a breakdown of rationality.
The next incredible blunder was that the big banks bought so many
collateralized debt obligations (CDO's). To be sure, they only bought those
securities in the CDOs that were rated AAA by the rating agencies. But
when they do a deal the rating agencies are paid a commission for rating the
securities and if they do not approve enough AAA securities the deal does
not get done and they get no money. The rating agencies do not own the
securities themselves, and so they do not have the best incentive to get their
ratings right. It is amazing that the banks did not take this into account
40and naively bought the AAA securities thinking they were truly safe.
Though many aspects of this crisis involve out-of-equilibrium phenomena
like irrational optimism, equilibrium theory can still be very insightful in
understanding what happened. In fact, it partially predicted the crisis.
In the rst place the brokers who winked at bad loans while collect-
ing their commisions, and the rating agencies who gave high grades to bad
bonds while collecting their commisions, were both responding to their in-
centives, just as equilibrium theory would predict, and as some economists
had predicted.
But more importantly, the swift transition from lax collateral levels per-
mitting too many risky loans to overly tight collateral levels strangling the
sub-prime market is typical of the so-called leverage cycle in equilibrium the-
ory. Once the equilibrium model is extended to allow for default on promises,
and to allow for the posting of collateral to guarantee loans, equilibrium de-
termines the collateral levels that will be used for promises (equivalently the
leverage borrowers will choose). The kind of bad news that increases un-
certainty also increases equilibrium collateral levels. In normal times these
collateral levels are too lax, and in crisis times they are too tight (see refs.
[73, 67]).
8 If not equilibrium, then what?
Ken Arrow began a lecture he gave at the Santa Fe Institute a few years ago
by saying that \economics is in chaos". In saying this he drew a contrast to
the situation in say, 1970, when rational expectations based equilibrium the-
ories were producing many new results and it looked as though they might
be able to solve many of the major problems in economics. At the time the
path for a young theoretical economist was clear. Now, in contrast, this is
up in the air. While the majority of economists still use rational expecta-
tions as the foundation for what they do, even the mainstream is investigat-
ing perturbations of this foundation, and some are seeking an entirely new
foundation. In this chapter we will sketch some possible directions. Many
of these approaches are overlapping and we try to stress the connections
between them.
We are not suggesting that equilibrium theory should be thrown out:
as emphasized earlier, there are many situations where it is extremely use-
ful. What we do argue is that it should be one among many tools in the
economist's toolbox. During the rise of the neoclassical paradigm over the
last fty years the emphasis on equilibrium theory has been so strong that
41most theoretical economists have been trained in little else.24 As a result
economics has suered.
Disequilibrium models are not new in economics. Keynes, for example,
made models that were essentially dynamical, without imposing equilibrium
conditions. These models fell out of favor for the good reason that many
of them failed. In the 1950s and 1960s Keynesians accepted the ination-
output trade-o we mentioned earlier, but government eorts to exploit that
relationship collapsed completely during the stagation of the 1970s (when
there was both high ination and low output). These failures were driving
forces in the modern equilibrium approach to macroeconomics, led by Lucas.
It is clear that for many problems in economics the ability to incorporate
human reasoning is necessary. However, there may be other ways to accom-
plish this goal, and there may also be other important economic problems
where human reasoning is not the central issue.
8.1 Behavioral and experimental nance
As already stressed in Section 5.3, one of the principal problems with rational
expectations equilibrium is the lack of realism of the agent model. The im-
portance of work in this direction was acknowledged by the mainstream with
the Nobel prizes of Daniel Kahneman, who is one of the pioneers behavioral
economics, and Vernon Smith, who is one of the pioneers of experimental
economics. Because these important elds are already well-covered in many
review articles [90, 146, 13, 160] we will not review them here, but rather
only make a few comments.
We think that a proper characterization of human behavior is an essen-
tial part of the future of economics. This is not going to be easy; people
are complicated and their behavior is malleable and context dependent. Ex-
perimental economics oers hope for categorizing the spectrum of human
behavior and predicting how people will behave in given situations, but the
results are dicult to reduce to quantitative mathematical form. So far
behavioral nance has done a good job of documenting the many ways in
which real investors are not rational, and has shown that this has important
nancial consequences. Although there has been some progress in under-
standing the implications of these facts for classical problems such as saving
and asset pricing [16, 147], the jury is still out concerning whether this can
be done in a fully quantitative manner.
24The obvious exception is econometrics, which is an essential part of economics, and
should remain so. But econometric models are not founded on a priori models of agent
behavior, and are not theories in the sense that we are using the word here.
42One must also worry that behavioral nance might be the victim of its
own success. If we discover new empirical rules for the irrational component
of human behavior, might not these rules be violated as people become aware
of them? For example, it has been widely shown that people are strongly
prone to overcondence. If this knowledge becomes widespread, will savvy
investors learn to compensate? In nancial markets there is a lot of money
on the table and the motivation for overcoming irrational behavior is large.
Of course, if this were to occur that would already be a major achievement
for the eld.
8.2 Structure vs. strategy
In comparing theoretical economists to theoretical biologists, Paul Krugman
has commented that the two are not so dierent as it might seem: both make
extensive use of game theoretic models [97]. This observation is true, but it
obscures a very important matter of degree. In biology game theory models
are one of many approaches used by theoreticians. In economics, game
theory models and their corollary form, equilibrium models, are almost the
only approach. From a certain point of view this is natural { the need
to take into account strategic interactions in economics is larger than it
is in biology. The problem is that strategic interactions are not the only
important factor in economic models. Other factors can also be important,
such as the nature of economic institutions, and how the interactions of
agents aggregate to generate economic phenomena at higher levels. We will
call the aspects of a problem that do not depend on strategy its structure. In
economics this occurs when equilibrium plays a role that is minor compared
to other factors, such as interaction dynamics or budgetary constraints. We
give several examples below. The substantial eort needed to capture the
strategic aspects of a problem in an equilibrium model can often cause the
structural aspects of a problem to be short-changed. In some cases the
importance of structural factors may dominate over strategic considerations,
and models that place too much emphasis on strategic interactions without
proper emphasis on structural properties will simply fail to capture the
essence of the problem. Of course in general one must take both into account.
8.2.1 Examples where structure dominates strategy
As an example of what we mean, consider trac. Cars are driven by people,
who anticipate the decisions of themselves and others. Yet an examination
of the literature on trac and trac control suggests that game theory and
43equilibrium play only a minor role. Instead the dominant theories look more
like physics [84, 128]. Trac is modeled by analogy with uid ow. The road
is a structural constraint and cars are interacting particles. Appropriately
modied versions of the same ideas that are used to understand the phases
of matter in physics are used to understand trac: A road with only a
few cars is like a gas, a crowded road where trac is still owing is like a
liquid, and a trac jam is like a solid. In the liquid phase perturbations can
propagate and induce trac jams; the equations that are used to understand
this are familiar to uid dynamicists.25 This is not because equilibrium is not
relevant, but rather because driving is tightly constrained by roads, trac
control, driving habits, and response times. The strategic considerations
are fairly simple and their importance is dominated by the mechanics of
particles (automobiles) moving under structural constraints.
The same holds true for crowd dynamics, where game theoretic notions
of equilibrium would also seem to be important. In moving through a crowd
one tries to avoid collisions with one's neighbors, while trying to reach a
given goal, such as a subway entrance. One's neighbors are thinking about
the same thing. There are lots of strategic interactions and it would seem
that game theory should be the key modeling principle. In fact this does not
seem to be the most important consideration for modeling the movement of
a crowd.
The problem of crowd dynamics becomes particularly important in ex-
treme situations when the density of people is high. For example, on Jan-
uary 12, 2006 roughly three million Muslims participated in the Hajj to
perform the stoning ritual. There was a panic and several hundred people
died as a result of either being crushed or trampled to death. In an eort
to understand why this occured the output of video cameras was processed
in order to reduce the crowd dynamics to a set of quantitative measure-
ments. Analysis by Helbing, Johannson and Al-Abideen [85] showed that
high densities of people facilitate the formation of density waves, similar to
those that occur in driven granular media.26 The crowd dynamics amplify
small perturbations and create pressure uctuations that caused people to
be crushed. The insights that were obtained by the study of the Hajj data
25In the medium density range, when drivers have delayed reactions or over-reactions to
random variations in the trac ow, a breakdown in trac ow is caused by a dynamic
instability of the stationary and homogeneous solution.
26During a New Year's Eve celebration at Trafalgar Square in London in 1980 one of
the authors (jdf) personally experienced the propagation of density waves through a large
crowd. The density waves propagate remarkably slowly. Their propagation speed can be
crudely estimated by regarding each person as an inverted pendulum.
44led to several modications in the methods of crowd control, and to a safe
Hajj pilgrimage the following year.
The skeptical economist might respond that these are not economic prob-
lems, and just because physical models such as uid dynamics apply to
crowd behavior does not imply that they should be useful in economics.
We included the examples above because they provide clear examples of
situations that involve people, where despite the presence of strategic in-
teractions, their ability to reason is not a dominant point in understanding
their aggregate behavior. We now discuss a few problems in economics where
similar considerations apply.
8.2.2 Distribution of wealth and rm size
As originally observed by Pareto, the distribution of income displays robust
regularities that are persistent across dierent countries and through time
[133]. For low to medium income it has a functional form that has been
variously described as exponential or log-normal [48, 165], but for very high
incomes it is better approximated by a power law. Since the early eorts of
Champernowne, Simon, and others, the most successful theories for explain-
ing this have been random process models for the acquisition and transfer
of wealth [33, 150, 118, 154, 48, 102, ?]. If these theories are right, then the
distribution of wealth, which is one of the most remarkable and persistent
properties of the economy, has little to do with the principles of equilibrium
theory, and indeed little to do with human cognition. Other problems with
a similar avor include the distribution of the sizes of rms, the size of cities
and the frequency with which words are used [166, 167, 150, 88, 71, 10, 9].
8.2.3 Zero intelligence models of auctions
The continuous double auction, which is perhaps the most commonly used
price formation mechanism in modern nancial markets, provides a nice
example of how in some cases it can be very useful to focus attention on
structural rather than strategic properties. In a continuous double auction
buyers and sellers are allowed to place or cancel trading orders whenever
they like, at the prices of their choosing. If an order to buy crosses a pre-
existing order to sell, or vice versa, there is a transaction. The way in which
orders are placed is obviously closely related to properties of prices, such
as volatility and the spread (the price gap between the best standing sell
order and the best standing buy order). There have been many attempts to
model the continuous double auction using equilibrium theory. One famous
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distribution of orders under a single period model. Tests of this model show
that it does not match reality very well [141].
In contrast, an alternative approach to this problem assumes a zero in-
telligence model.27 This approach was originally pioneered by Becker [14],
who showed that some aspects of supply and demand curves could be un-
derstood without any reliance on strategic thinking. The notion that a
zero intelligence model might be useful for understanding economic phe-
nomena was further developed by Gode and Sunder [79], who popularized
this phrase and argued that observations of eciency in classroom experi-
ments on auctions could be explained without relying on agent intelligence.
Zero intelligence models of the continuous double auction make the assump-
tion that people place orders more or less at random. We say \more or
less" because there is more than one way to characterize their behavior,
and one can argue that some of these involve at least some strategic think-
ing, and so are not strictly speaking zero intelligence. The development of
zero intelligence models of the continuous double auction has a long history
[124, 39, 46, 12, 17, 51, 123, 152, 32, 41, 36, 21, 153, 64, 126].
In some cases zero intelligence models make successful predictions. For
example, by assuming that order ow follows simple Poisson processes, the
model of Daniels et al. [41, 153] derives equations of state relating statistical
properties of order ow such as the rates of trading order placement and
cancellation to statistical properties of prices such as volatility and the bid-
ask spread. Some of these predictions are borne out by empirical data
[64]. The development of such zero intelligence models has guided more
empirically grounded \low intelligence models", which rene the statistical
processes for order placement and cancellation. For certain categories of
stocks this results in accurate quantitative prediction of the distribution of
volatility and also of the distribution of the spread [126].
These models can be criticized because they fail in an important respect:
the resulting price series are not ecient. This is a failing, but it illustrates
an important point: the fact that a good prediction of the distribution of
volatility can be made from a model that does not satisfy eciency suggests
that the distribution of volatility may not depend on eciency. Instead,
the structural properties of the continuous double auction appear to be
more important. In this case by \structural properties" we mean those that
27\Zero intelligence" loosely refers to models in which the agents have minimal cognitive
capacity. It should more accurately be properly called \ intelligence", since often agents
do have some cognitive ability, e.g. the capacity to draw from a known distribution or to
enforce a budget constraint.
46come directly from the structure of the auction, e.g. the rules under which
transactions take place, the dynamics of removal and deposition of orders,
and their interactions with price formation. These models suggest that for
many purposes the structure of the institution used to make trades plays an
important role.
The zero intelligence approach is similar to the equilibrium model in the
sense that both approaches are parsimonious but sometimes highly unre-
alistic. By making the simple assumption that people do not think at all,
one can focus on aspects of a problem that would be missed by an equi-
librium analysis. Equilibrium and zero intelligence models rovide ways to
enter the wilderness of bounded rationality without becoming totally lost;
the two approaches are complementary because they enter this wilderness
from opposite sides.
Of course, many problems, including the double auction, require an un-
derstanding of both structure and strategy, and the art of good modeling is
to nd the right compromise in emphasizing these two facets of economics.
A good recent example is the theory of Wyart et al. who show that a mix-
ture of market eciency and structural arguments can be used to explain the
relationship between the spread, price impact and volatility in transaction
time [164].
8.3 Bounded rationality, specialization, and heterogeneous
agents
As originally pointed out by Adam Smith, the cognitive limitations of real
agents cause them to specialize.28 In nance, agents use specialized trading
strategies. A few common examples are fundamental valuation, technical
trading (interpreting patterns in historical price movements), many forms
of derivative pricing, statistical arbitrage, market making, index arbitrage,
and term structure models. The champions of heterogeneous models believe
that to understand asset pricing as it manifests itself in the real world, it
is necessary to understand the behaviors of at least some of these types of
agents and their inter-relationships and interactions.
During the last couple of decades a new school of boundedly rational
28Equilibrium models often begin with asymmetric information a priori. See for example
the classic paper of Grossman and Stiglitz [82], which can be viewed as an example of
a rational treatment of heterogeneous agents emerging from idiosyncratic information.
Noise trader models provide another example [143]. For a modern treatment of agents
who are a priori the same but choose to specialize and learn dierent things on account
of information processing constraints see [74].
47heterogeneous agent (BRHA) models has emerged in nance. The primary
motivation of this work has been to explain phenomena such as bubbles and
crashes, clustered volatility, excess volatility, excess trading volume and the
heavy tails of price returns. As discussed in Sections 6 and 7.1, these phe-
nomena have so far not been explained by equilibrium theory. In contrast
there are now many BRHA models that produce these phenomena. The
typical BRHA models that have been constructed so far study a single asset
and assume that exogenous information enters through a stochastic process
corresponding to the dividends paid by that asset. The most common tech-
nique is to simulate the resulting market behavior on a computer, though
some studies also derive analytic results. This style of work often goes under
the name of agent-based modeling [98, 158, 159].
Roughly speaking BRHA models can be divided into those that identify
classes of agents a priori and those that use learning to generate hetero-
geneous agents de novo. Examples of models that assume heterogeneous
agents a priori are found in references [15, 27, 24, 25, 29, 34, 35, 42, 60, 62,
94, 95, 114, 115, 117, 137]. The most commonly studied categories of agents
are value investors, who price stocks according to their fundamentals, and
trend followers, who buy stocks that have recently increased in price and sell
stocks that have recently decreased in price. The learning models assume
heterogeneous learning algorithms (or starting points) a priori and then let
the strategies evolve as learning takes place, thereby generating the hetero-
geneous strategies de novo. Examples of this approach are given in references
[8, 31, 76, 89, 101, 98, 99, 100]. This approach lets strategies co-evolve in
response to the conditions created by each other, as well as in response to
exogenously changing fundamentals. The typical result produces a highly
heterogeneous population of trading strategies.
Simulations of such systems show that they naturally generate the ap-
parently nonequilibrium phenomena mentioned earlier, including clustered
volatility, heavy tails, bubbles and crashes, and excess trading. In most of
these models the primary cause of clustered volatility is changes in the pop-
ulations of dierent kinds of trading strategies. The population can shift
due to exogenous conditions, but most of the shifting appears to be largely
random, due to context-dependent uctuations in the protability of one
group vs. another. Changes in the exogenously provided fundamentals are
amplied with feedback. In some cases it is possible to show that in an anal-
ogous equilibrium model none of these phenomena would arise [8, 101, 99].
Furthermore, in some cases it is possible to calibrate these BRHA models
against real data and get a good t for properties such as the distribution
of returns and the autocorrelation function of volatility [89, 76, 100, 116, 3].
48Thus the more developed models in this class make testable predictions.
Note that such studies do not claim that information arrival does not have
an eect, but only that a substantial component of volatility, and in partic-
ular its interesting statistical properties, are internally generated.
Most of these BRHA models produce uncorrelated prices and arbitrage
eciency between the simulated strategies. In the more sophisticated mod-
els, capital is reallocated so that more protable agents gain capital, giving
them a greater eect on price formation. After sucient simulation time
these models reach a state in which the remaining strategies are all equally
protable (and are in this sense arbitrage ecient). When this occurs the
autocorrelations in prices also disappear. This is not complete eciency in
the sense that it is possible (at least in principle) to introduce new strate-
gies that are not within the generated set, that can exploit nonlinear price
patterns and temporarily make prots. (For some examples see [60].) After
enough time for capital to reallocate the advantage of those strategies also
disappears. This shows that that the prediction of eciency by equilibrium
models is not as striking as it might seem { the simulation models discussed
above generate results that are dicult to distinguish from true eciency.
Thus, these models provide a means, albeit crude, to take reasoning into
account, and satisfy many of the desiderata for modeling agent behavior
discussed in Section 4.
A great deal remains to be done in this area. Many of the the models
mentioned above illustrate the principle (by generating say clustered volatil-
ity), but they do not make quantitative predictions about the real economy.
Most of them are not very parsimonious. There are still major open ques-
tions about the necessary and sucient conditions required for generating
the phenomena of interest. For instance, it is not absolutely clear what
features of the models that generate the phenomena are incompatible with
equilibrium. It is even possible that some equilibrium model might also
generate the same phenomena, but equilibrium models are so hard to com-
pute that examples have not yet been discovered. Further validation and
testing and simplication are needed before we can have a high degree of
condence that the detailed explanations of these BRHA models are correct.
Still more work is required to apply the lessons of BRHA models to asset
pricing and market design. Nonetheless, these models apper to conrm the
physics lesson that certain kinds of empirical regularities (power laws) are
the consequences of non-equilibrium behavior of the market.
498.4 Finance through the lens of biology
The inuence of biology on economics dates back at least to Alfred Marshall
[161, 68, 129, 53, 140, 63, 60, 108]. Both biology and economics involve
specialized agents evolving through time under strong selection pressure,
and it is not surprising that they share many features, such as extensive use
of game theory. In this section we consider other aspects of biology that are
not captured by game theory and ask whether nancial economics might
not benet by taking some lessons from biology.
Note that the biological point of view is particularly complementary with
that of BRHA modeling. Biology is after all a study of specialized organisms
and their interactions with each other, and thus provides a lens for viewing
many aspects of nancial markets.
8.4.1 Taxonomy of nancial strategies
Taxonomy is the study of classication. By sorting complex phenomena such
as organisms into categories we compress an enormous amount of informa-
tion into a comprehensible scheme. Taxonomy has historically been one of
the principal activities of biologists. Perhaps the most famous taxonomist
is Carl Linnaeus, who in the middle of the eighteenth century introduced
the hierarchical classication of organisms into categories at varying levels
of dierentiation, proposed a list of characteristics for classication, and
created the standardized nomenclature that is still largely used today. The
taxonomic classication of organisms has beneted from the participation of
hundreds of thousands or perhaps millions of individuals for more than three
hundred years and continues to be a eld of active research and sometimes
heated debates in biology. Although taxonomy might seem to be a very
limited end in and of itself, it has proved to be an important prerequisite
for the development and testing of the theory of evolution in biology.
An economist, Adam Smith, was one of the rst to point out the im-
portance of specialization, and in some branches of economics, such as in-
dustrial economics, this is a eld of active research. Not so in nance. To
our knowledge there are only two papers that gather empirical data on the
nature of real trading strategies in nancial markets (and both of these pa-
pers only address the frequency of usage of two preassigned categories of
strategies, technical trading and value investing) [92, 125]. The diversity
and specialized functions performed by the trading desks of major nancial
institutions suggest that there is an enormous amount waiting to be done if
we are to understand the taxonomy of real trading strategies. The BRHA
50models mentioned above suggest that such diversity is important and plays
a key role in price formation. If this endeavor is to enter the realm of hard
science it needs a grounding in empirical data. We believe that market
taxonomy should become a major eld of study by nancial economists.
Electronic data storage presents the possibility of gathering data with infor-
mation about the identity of agents, which can potentially form the basis for
such taxonomies. Preliminary results in this direction have already yielded
interesting results [106, 169].
8.4.2 Market ecology
For biological systems ecology is the study of organisms and their rela-
tionship to their environment, including each other. Simulations of BRHA
models make it clear that understanding the relationships between nancial
strategies is also important in nancial economics. Market ecology is an
attempt to develop a theory that gives a deeper and more universal under-
standing of this [60].
Under the analogy to biology a nancial strategy can be viewed as a
species, and the capital invested in it can be viewed as its population. If
strategies are successful they accumulate more capital, which causes them
to have more inuence in setting prices. The price provides the principal
channel through which dierent strategies interact { the movements of prices
inuence the buying and selling activity of strategies, which in turn aects
prices. On a longer timescale the movements of prices also aects protabil-
ity, which alters the capital invested in strategies and is the main driver of
the selection process underlying market evolution.
In most BRHA models, price setting is done using a standard method,
such as market clearing, but even when this is the case, it can be very useful
to view the interactions of strategies in terms of their market impact. The
market impact is the price movement corresponding to the initiation of a
trade of a given size, and is equivalent (up to a constant of proportionality) to
the demand elasticity of price originally introduced by Marshall [47]. Market
impact is an increasing function of trading volume. As the capital invested
in a strategy grows, market impact lowers realized returns and ultimately
limits the trading capital that any given strategy can support. With a
proper understanding of market impact it is possible to derive dierential
equations for the dynamics of capital ows between strategies, analogous to
the generalized Lotka-Volterra models of population biology [60].
Market impact also provides a way to understand the strength of the
interactions between strategies and to classify them in ecological terms. In
51particular, it is possible to make a pairwise classication of strategies ac-
cording to their inuence on each other's prots by understanding how a
variation in the capital associated with strategy j inuences the prots of
strategy i. Letting i be the return of strategy i and Cj be the capital in-
vested in strategy j, one can dene a gain matrix Gij = @i=@Cj. If Gij < 0
and Gji < 0 strategies i and j have a competitive relationship; if Gij > 0
and Gji < 0 then they have a predator-prey relationship, in which i preys
on j, and if Gij > 0 and Gji > 0 they have a mutualistic (or symbiotic) rela-
tionship. The ecological view asserts that the set of such relationships in the
market is critical to its function, and that the proper diversity of nancial
strategies may be critical for market stability. This view also provides an
evolutionary framework in which to understand the path toward eciency.
Until recently this ecological view of markets was essentially hypothetical
and it was not clear that the resulting models were testable. Recently,
however, the acquisition of data sets in which there is information about
brokerages or individual investors has opened up the possibility of calibrating
such models and testing their predictions against real data [106, 169]. It
will be interesting to determine whether one can link properties of nancial
ecologies to properties of price formation. For example, do alterations in
nancial ecologies inuence price volatility?
8.4.3 Evolutionary nance
The three essential elements of evolutionary theory are descent, variation,
and selection. Financial ecologies are formed by these precisely these forces:
 Descent. Financial strategies are passed down through time as traders
change and start new rms.
 Variation. Old strategies are modied and improved to create new
strategies.
 Selection. Successful strategies proliferate and unsuccessful strategies
disappear. Success is substantially based on protability, but is also
inuenced by other factors such as marketing and psychological appeal.
The view that prot selection is important is not new, having been cham-
pioned as a force for creating ecient markets by central gures in nancial
economics such as Milton Friedman and Eugene Fama [70, 57]. The theory
of market eciency amounts to the assertion that it is possible to short-
circuit the evolutionary process and go directly to its endpoints, in which
52evolution has run its course and prots of well-developed strategies are re-
duced to low levels. The suggestion that the timescales for this process are
not short, as presented in Section 7.3, motivate more detailed studies of the
transient properties of the evolutionary process and its dynamics. This view
implicitly underlies all the BRHA models we have discussed so far, and is
also now being given a more mathematical underpinning [86, 87].
What is still largely lacking is an empirical foundation on which to build
an evolutionary theory. This ultimately depends on developing a taxonomy
of real nancial strategies together with a database of studies of nancial
ecologies as they change through time.
8.5 The complex systems viewpoint
Complex systems refers to the idea that systems composed of simple com-
ponents interacting via simple rules can give rise to complex emergent be-
haviors, in which in a certain sense the whole is greater than the sum of its
parts. With his introduction of the concept of the \invisible hand" Adam
Smith was one of the earliest to articulate this point of view. The general
equilibrium theory of Arrow and Debreu can be regarded as an attempt to
cut through the complexity of individual interactions and reduce the invis-
ible hand to a tractable mathematical form. It appears, though, that for
many purposes this approach is just too simple { to understand real nancial
economies we need to do the hard work of understanding who the agents
are, what factors cause them to change, and how they interact with each
other. In order to do this we need better taxonomic studies of real mar-
kets, better simulation models, and better theory. To the external observer,
current research in nancial economics has so far largely failed to capture
the richness of real markets, which provide some of the best examples of
complex systems. More robust contact between nancial economics and the
emerging eld of complex systems could help remedy this situation.
9 Conclusion
We have written this article with a dual purpose. On one hand, we worry
that physicists often misunderstand the equilibrium framework in economics,
and fail to appreciate the very good reasons for its emergence. On the other
hand, the majority of economists have become so conditioned to explain
everything in terms of equilibrium that they do not appreciate that there
are many circumstances in which this is unlikely to be appropriate. We
hope that physicists will begin to incorporate equilibrium into their models
53when appropriate, and that economists will become more aware of analogies
from other elds and begin to explore the possibilities of alternatives to the
standard equilibrium framework.
Our own belief is that one must choose modeling methods based on the
context of the problem. In situations where the cognitive task to be solved
is relatively simple, where there is good information available for model
formation, and where the estimation problems are tractable, rational expec-
tations equilibrium is likely to provide a good explanation. Some examples
where this is true include option pricing, hedging, or the pricing of mortgage-
backed securities. In other cases where the cognitive task is extraordinarily
complex, such as the pricing of a new rm, or where estimation problems
are severe, such as portfolio formation, human models may diverge signi-
cantly from rational models, and the equilibrium framework may be a poor
approximation. For good science one must choose the right tool for the job,
and in this case the good scientist must use an assortment of dierent tools.
Close-mindedness in either direction is not likely to be productive.
As we have stressed, equilibrium theory is an elegant attempt to nd
a parsimonious model of human behavior in economic settings. It can be
criticized, though, as a quick and dirty method, a heroic attempt to simplify
a complex problem. Now that we have begun to understand its limitations,
we must begin the hard work of laying new foundations that can potentially
go beyond it.
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